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INVESTIGATING THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL REALM OF
BIBLICAL-THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY,
PART I: DOOYEWEERD ON REASON
Oliver Glanz
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Introducing the Article Series1
It has long been recognized that the field of biblical theology has an
enormous plurality of competing and often mutually exclusive methodologies
(e.g., literary, form, canon, structuralist, new, reader-response, sociopolitical,
and depth-psychological criticisms),2 resulting in many different theologies.3
Together with the often-lacking awareness of the foundation of one’s own
methodological approach, this situation has complicated and politicized many
dialogues. As a result, biblical theology, with its great methodological discord
is, as such, becoming increasingly disreputable. Biblical theologians who
take this diffuse methodological situation seriously and invest in theoretical
thinking can be divided into two trends.
Adherents of the first trend seem to believe that the potential for
developing completely new methodologies is exhausted. Here one either
(a) discusses which methodologies should be ruled out or (b) accepts the
intentionalities of the different methodologies as justified but limited aspects
of biblical hermeneutics. As biblical hermeneutics is concerned with examining
the relationship between the biblical text and its reader, it basically comprises
1
I want to thank especially Danielle Koning for helping me to polish my English
and Sven Fockner who took the time to proofread my article.
2
See Steven McKenzie and Stephen Haynes, eds., To Each Its Own Meaning:
An Introduction to Biblical Criticisms and Their Application (Louisville, KY: Westminster
John Knox, 1999); John Barton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Manfred Oeming, Biblische hermeneutik:
Eine Einführung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998).
3
Representative for the discipline of biblical theology, Rainer Albertz describes
the present situation in OT theology as follows:
“
Auffällig ist die verwirrende Vielfalt der über 20 Theologien, die seit 1933
erschienen sind. Mag man dies noch als Ausdruck der Lebendigkeit der Disziplin
werten, so muß doch nachdenklich stimmen, daß auch 60 Jahre, nachdem der erste
Band der epochemachenden Theologie von Walther Eichrodt publiziert wurde, immer
noch kein Konsens darüber ereicht werden konnte, wie die Aufgabe, der Aufbau und
die Methode einer Theologie des Alte Testaments zu bestimmen sind. Im Gegenteil,
die Divergenz der Ansätze hat sich in jüngster Zeit eher noch erhöht.
“
Hinzu kommt eine verblüffende Gesprächsunfähigkeit zwischen den
verschiedenen Entwürfen. Kaum ein Verfasser einer neuen Theologie geht auf die
vorangehenden ein, versucht, sie zu diskutieren, ihre Schwächen aufzudecken und zu
einer nachweisbar besseren Lösung zu gelangen” (“Religionsgeschichte Israels statt
Theologie des Alten Testaments!” in Jahrbuch für biblische Theologie 10 [1995], 6).
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the effective aspect of the author, the linguistic corpus, and the reader in the
process of understanding. For biblical scholars who accept the intentionalities
of different methodologies as justified, it is the different unbalanced emphases
on hermeneutical aspects that underlie the methodological differences.
This unbalanced treatment of hermeneutical aspects causes author-, text-,
and reader-oriented methodologies.4 Since the hermeneutical process of
reading requires all three of these foci for a proper understanding, multiple
methodologies are accepted as legitimate if their limited vantage point is
recognized.5 Since the intentionalities of the different methodologies are
understood to represent the different possible, complementary, and necessary
hermeneutical perspectives, methodological plurality is considered to be
positive. This positive attitude, however, does not come without emphasizing
the inherent limitations of the individual methodologies and, therefore, their
exclusivist claims are also critiqued.6 Hence, attempts are made to order them
according to an appropriate procedural sequence.7
Literary criticism, sociohistorical exegeses, historical psychology, and new
archaeology are considered author-oriented approaches. Structuralism, new literary
criticism, canonical criticism, and discourse analysis represent text-oriented approaches.
Reader-response criticism, depth-psychological exegesis, liberation-theology exegesis,
and feministic exegesis are considered reader-oriented.
5
Eep Talstra does not agree “that adopting a new method implies that an earlier
method has become superfluous” and thus states that “there is no need to present
them in historical order” (“From The ‘Eclipse’ to the ‘Art’ of Biblical Narrative:
Reflections on Methods of Biblical Exegesis,” in Perspectives in the Study of the Old
Testament and Early Judaism: A Symposium in Honour of Adam S. van der Woude on the
Occasion of his 70th Birthday, ed. F. G. Martinez and E. Noort [Leiden: Brill, 2002], 5).
The order that is suggested by Talstra is thus of a procedural rather than a historical
nature. To him, the methodological plurality is rooted in the plurality of the reading
process. Consequently, methodological pluralism does not need to be overcome, but
only critically organized.
6
Like Talstra and Manfred Oeming, Barton has worked on the allocation of
the many methodologies within the hermeneutical process of reading texts and (as
a result) argues for the limitations of each method. However, he does not develop
an order of methodologies. Similar to Barton, but with much more clarity, Oeming,
175, stresses the need of methodological plurality by quoting Merklein, “Die neueren
Zugänge zur Bibel und die herkömmliche historische-kritische Exegese sind nicht als
Alternative zu verstehen. Es handelt sich um unterschiedliche Fragestellungen, die
sich in methodischer und hermeneutischer Hinsicht gegenseitig ergänzen. Wie die
Verzahnung zu erfolgen hat, ist noch nicht abschließend geklärt.” Oeming predictably
concludes: “Keine Methode kann mit Gründen exclusive monopolansprüche
anmelden.”
7
Epp Talstra suggests that, after having allocated the different methods with their
aspects in the reading process, the theologian needs to start with the analysis of the
text. Here the analysis of the text’s linguistic system is prior to the analysis of the text’s
rhetorical composition. The specific methods developed for linguistic and rhetorical
criticism find their application in this first step (text-orientation). Second, the analysis
4
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The second trend is represented by those biblical theologians who do not
consider the different methods to be complementary. Adherents of this trend,
in their dissatisfaction with existing methodologies, see the need and possibility
for further methodological development.8 The plurality of methodologies is
often not only problematic due to methodological incompatibility, but also
because many methodologies are founded on a metaphysic that is foreign
to the biblical testimony.9 The latter obstructs a satisfactory understanding
of the biblical text. Some scholars are therefore motivated to dispose of the
Greek-Occidental metaphysic that forms the presuppositional character of
most theological methodologies.10 However, although the deconstruction of
problematic metaphysical presuppositions is often made from a philosophical
of the author’s intention, i.e., the background to the text’s production and history,
follows (author-orientation). Here the different historical-critical methodologies that
focus on the author’s intention are applied in order to reconstruct the text and its textual
tradition. The third step is focused on the reader and his position in being confronted
by the text (reader-orientation). Here reader-response criticism and poststructuralist
methodologies can be applied in order to help the single reader or religious community
to become part of the long hermeneutical tradition of participating in the biblical
testimony (“Texts and Their Readers: On Reading the Old Testament in Context of
Theology,” in The Rediscovery of the Hebrew Bible, ed. Janet Kyk et al. (Maastricht: Shaker,
1999), 101-120; idem, “From the ‘Eclipse’ to the ‘Art’ of Biblical Narrative,” 1-14;
idem, Oude en Nieuwe Lezers: Een inleiding in de methoden van uitleg van het Oude Testament
(Kampen: Uitgeverij Kok, 2002), 81-83, 97-120.
The practice of ordering methods in terms of procedure can also be found in
Oeming’s work. However, he disagrees with the procedural order of Talstra and starts
with author-oriented methodologies (Oeming, 175-184).
8
A variety of thinkers could be mentioned here. After critically surveying the
methodological scenery, Gerhard Hasel concludes “that a basically new approach
must be worked out” (Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate [Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991], 194). The dissatisfaction about the methodological situation
led Christof Hardmeier to develop a text-pragmatic study of literature (Erzähldiskurs
und Redepragmatik im Alten Testament: unterwegs zu einer performativen Theologie der Bibel
[Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005]). Contrary to Hardmeier, Rainer Albertz distances
himself from methods that focus on the establishing of an OT theology by arguing
for a history-of-religions approach (A History of Israelite Religion in the Old Testament
Period [Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1999]).
9
E.g., the “loss of the author” within structuralistic methods could be
mentioned.
10
A good example is Christof Hardmeier, who tries to dissociate from the classical
idea of “theology” as the designation of doctrinal display of the Christian credence.
In contrast to “theology,” he develops the idea of “theo-logy,” in order to focus on the
biblical text as “speaking about and speaking of God” (“Systematische Elemente der
Theo-logie in der Hebräischen Bibel: Das Loben Gottes—ein Kristallisationsmoment
biblischer Theo-logie,” in Jahrbuch für biblische Theologie 10 (1995) in Erzähldiskurs
und Redepragmatik im Alten Testament. Unterwegs zu einer performativen Theologie, FAT 46
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), S. 339-354.
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perspective, the construction of new methodologies seems to lack a newly
developed basic metaphysical conception.
The two trends share a commonality in that they critically study the
methodological situation and its hermeneutical backgrounds. This attitude is
obligatory for any biblical theologian who desires to find a reasonable way to
understand Scripture and who desires to be faithful to the discovery of truth.
The present unsatisfactory situation of methodological plurality demands a
thorough investigation of its very foundations in order to choose or develop
one’s own working methodology. Within Seventh-day Adventism, Gerhard
Hasel has pioneered the critical investigation of methodologies used in
exegesis and biblical theology.11
However, aside from praising both trends for their critical stance, I see a
problem in their procedure. In order to better understand this problem, it is
helpful to examine methodology from the perspective of the human act of
interpretation. Fernando Canale explains that the human act of interpretation
“moves from the subject that interprets to the issue or thing that is interpreted.
The human act of interpretation, then, has a beginning, a movement, and an
end. The end is the issue (object) interpretation seeks to understand. The
movement is the process through which we interpret the issues. The beginning
includes the thing (reality) and the perspective (presuppositions) from which
we start the interpretative act.”12
The problem, then, in the usual procedure of examining methodologies, is
that methodologies are primarily judged in terms of functionality, focusing on
what a specific methodology claims and is able to perform. The present debate,
therefore, especially focuses on the methodological aspect of movement, i.e.,
on the procedure or functionality of a specific methodology. It loses sight
of the importance to critically investigate methodological presuppositions,
i.e., starting points. Generally, the application of functionalistic criteria does
not take place in ignorance of philosophical presuppositions. The point is,
however, that these presuppositions are not deeply examined.13 James Barr
stresses this observation in his critique on classical historical criticism by saying
that “To this day there does not exist any really clear and philosophically valid
See Hasel, Old Testament Theology; and idem, New Testament Theology: Basic Issues in
the Current Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993).
12
Fernando Canale, “Evangelical Theology and Open Theism: Toward a Biblical
Understanding of the Macro Hermeneutical Principles of Theology?” JATS 12/2
(2001): 20.
13
E.g., Hasel has given an insightful critical analysis of the methodological
plurality within biblical theology in his Old Testament Theology. However, although
he engages the crucial issue within the debate of his time by pointing out that “the
distinction between what a text meant and what a text means is at the core of the
most fundamental problem of OT theology” (30), he still remains on the level of
functionality and procedure. Although he recognizes the philosophical dimension that
lies behind the “what it meant” and “what it means” problematic, he does not involve
himself in a critical philosophical examination.
11
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account of what traditional biblical criticism was doing!”14 In his sensitivity
to the situation, John Barton is aware of this imbalance. He explains that
the core problem of methodological plurality will not be exhaustively tackled
by a mere comparison of the functionality and knowledge-generating ability
of methodologies. Barton asks for a thorough examination of the role of
method as such.15 This conclusion targets the epistemological foundations
of methodology, which Barton describes as the “metacritical” issue that
demands proper and specifically philosophical analysis.16 However, like many
other critical thinkers, Barton himself does not attempt to investigate the
presuppositional level, as he does not consider himself to be an expert in the
field of philosophy.17
Thus, on one hand, there is a general awareness by critics of
methodological plurality, that methodology cannot be reduced to procedures
that help one to arrive at an understanding of the specific objects in focus
(e.g., the biblical text); rather it also includes philosophical presuppositions.
However, on the other hand, the main focus in the evaluation of methods
still remains on the practical ability of methodologies to deliver justified
and relevant result, i.e., they remain procedure oriented. An examination in
terms of functionality helps to grasp the consequences, i.e., the results or
ends of specific methodologies for biblical exegesis. It does not go to the
theoretical core of the problem, but remains on the surface level of practice.
James Barr, “The Synchronic, the Diachronic and the Historical: A Triangular
Relationship?” in Synchronic or Diachronic? A Debate on Method in Old Testament Exegesis,
ed. Johannes C. de Moor (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 9.
15
John Barton, Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox, 1996), 4.
16
Ibid.
17
The result is that Barton critiques the different methodologies in regard to their
applicational shortcomings and limitations. Contrary to Hasel, he does not eventually
make a proposal for a basically new approach in methodology, but rather argues
against the pursuit of a “correct” methodology, although he has not investigated
the metacritical issue that he considers to be the root of the entire problem (Reading
the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study [Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox,
1996], 237). Consequently, Barton’s suggestion, 246, is dissatisfying, hinting that the
diversity of methods will only become a problem when a single method is perceived
to be “correct,” i.e., the only way of approaching the human act of reading and
understanding a text. Thus, the absolutization and exclusivity of a specific method is
considered problematic, not the methods as part of a hermeneutical whole. If the latter
would be critically analyzed, much more far-reaching and promising methodological
considerations could be developed, as Klaus Berger states for the biblical historicist
“Die Konsequenzen dieser Selbstbesinnung [Berger refers to the critical metaphysical
reflection] des historikers auf seine eigenen Möglichkeiten könnten erheblich sein,
insbesondere angesichts der häufig zu konstatierenden Überfremdung der Historie
durch Metaphysik aufgrund mangelnder Lust oder Bereitschaft der Historiker, sich auf
systematische Erwägungen einzulassen” (Hermeneutik des Neuen Testaments [Tübingen:
A. Franke, 1999], 63).
14
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Our situation within biblical theology is, however, far too serious for limiting
our critical attitude to the watchword “whatever works is fine for me.”
Although we appreciate the efforts taken to critically examine the
problematic pluralistic methodological situation, we need to look for new
criteria that are able to examine not only the ends of methods, but their
beginnings. An analytical frame needs to be developed that goes beyond a
critical reflection on the pragmatic efficiency of methodologies to their very
foundation. Any methodology is undergirded by a specific concept of human
cognition (epistemology).18 Thus if we really want to understand methodology
in general and our present situation in particular, we need to come to grips
with the structure of epistemology and its ontological foundation.19 Through
such a framework, both beginning and end, i.e., presuppositional starting
points and theological consequences, can be critically examined.
The current methodological debate within biblical theology has been
especially kindled through the conflict between the students of the history-ofreligions approach (Lemche, Thompson, Albertz, Davies) and the adherents of
the classical approach to OT theology.20 Joachim Schaper’s latest contribution
to this debate comes to the same conclusion that I am suggesting.21 He reasons
that it is because of the unawareness of the epistemological foundation
of science that some thinkers create the impression of being naïve and
ignorant.22 According to Schaper, and I wholeheartedly agree, a reflection on
Any research methodology implies an understanding of how one can come to
true knowledge. Therefore, a concept of the process of cognition and knowledge in
general is a precondition for any methodology.
19
Any concept of human cognition already assumes a general understanding of
what can and cannot be known. Hence there is no concept of the epistemic (specific
epistemology) without a concept of the ontic (specific ontology). On the other
hand, a concept of the ontic is dependent on the very process of cognition and the
understanding thereof. Ontology and epistemology, then, are independent.
20
See the debate in Jahrbuch für biblische Theologie 10 (1995), and in the latest critical
contention of Jens Kofoed, Text and History: Historiography and the Study of the Biblical
Text (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2005).
21
Joachim Schaper, “Auf der Suche nach dem alten Israel? Text, Artefakt um
‘Geschichte Israels’ in der alttestamentlichen Wissenschaft vor dem hintergrund
der Methodendiskussion in den Historischen Kulturwissenschaften Teil I, II” ZAW
118/1, 2 (2006): 181-196.
22
Schaper, 8, writes, “Aus den Äußerungen Lemches, seines Kopenhagener und
seines Sheffielder Kollegen sprechen eine bemerkenswerte Naivität und eine geradezu
atemberaubende Unkenntnis der epistemologischen Problematik.” He, 10, also states
that the contributions of the history-of-religions approach are “erkenntnischtheoretisch
völlig haltlos, einerseits in ihren naiven Forderungen nach ‘Tatsachen’ und ‘Beweisen’
einem spätestens seit Droysen obsoleten Vulgär-Rankeanismus huldigen und
andererseits in der Art ihrer grundsätzlichen Infragestellung aller bisherigen historischphilologischen Exegeses des Alten Testamentes als ‘tendenziöse Rekonstruktion einer
fiktiven Vergangenheit, die fundamentalistischen Absichten dient.’”
18
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the epistemological foundation of science is needed if any further debate is
to remain fruitful and if a solution to the current methodological crises in
biblical theology is to be found.23 Schaper, an OT theologian, shows how OT
theology in general creates the impression that it has not yet reflected on the
epistemological understanding of Max Weber.24 He further shows how the
history-of-religions approach is breathtakingly ignorant of the epistemological
problem.25 Schaper argues that serious biblical theologians can no longer work
on the basis of the Rankian positivism, but need to acknowledge the shift
toward the “autogenesis of cognitive reality” initiated by Heinrich Rickert and
Max Weber. The idea of the “autogenesis of cognitive reality” supposes that
the criteria for truth need to be sought within the logical realm of the subject
and not within the material realm of the object, which is never accessible as
Ding an sich. This shift automatically generates a change in the understanding
and meaning of historical facts, ancient texts, and archaeological artifacts as
objects of scientific research.26
Although Schaper concludes that epistemological reflection is necessary
for a reorientation in the field of OT studies, he is surprisingly uncritical
of the Kantian idea of a “universal logic of science” (universal gültige Logik
der Forschung).27 This is astonishing since the ontological foundation of the
Kantian idea of the universality of the subject’s logic has been convincingly
critiqued within postmodern philosophy. The latter has shown that science
can no longer “rest on the absolute, unmovable ground of human reason, but
on the hypothetical foundation of human imagination.”28
However, we see how Schaper shifts the basic issue in the current debate
from the text-oriented “material” or procedural questions to the call for a
proper understanding of the formal structure of human reasoning. We can
consequently conclude that the debate about the problematic diversity of
methodologies is no longer limited to discussing procedures of method that
do not seem to do justice to the biblical text, its authors, and its readers,
but points beyond procedure to the understanding of human reasoning
23
Schaper, 5, formulates the need “das eigene Vorgehen auf der Höhe des
geschichtstheoretischen Erkenntnisstandes epistemologisch zu reflektieren.”
24
See Max Weber, “Die ‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer
Erkenntnis,” in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftlehre, ed. Johannes Winkelmann
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1982), 146-214. For a short introduction to Weber’s
methodological understanding of science of culture and history, see Friedrich Jäger
and Jörn Rüsen, Geschichte des Historismus: Eine Einführung (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck,
1992), 156-160.
25
Ibid., 8.
26
Ibid., 8-9.
27
Ibid., 9, 11.
28
Fernando Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive Foundations
of Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Lanham: University Press of America, 2001),
9.
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(epistemology) that methodological procedures necessarily assume.29 Thus
the call for an examination of the epistemological ground of biblical studies
increases in volume.30
So far, the need and duty of the biblical theologian and science to
understand the epistemological foundation of methodologies and critically
develop his or her own understanding in this matter is introduced. My goal
in this series of articles is to contribute to critical and analytical thinking in
order to stimulate further methodological deconstruction and development. In
the first two articles, I will introduce the ground-breaking work of the Dutch
Reformed Christian philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd (current article) and the
Argentinean Christian philosopher and theologian Fernando Canale (second
article) in regard to their respective structures and interpretations of human
understanding from a radical Christian perspective.31 Their pioneering work, in
which they critically analyze the widely held claim of the neutrality of human
Since epistemology lies at the foundation of any science, an understanding of
epistemology in general and the development of one’s own epistemology in particular
will be most fruitful for both the inner theological debate and the encounter and debate
with any other science. It is not only in the realm of theology in general and biblical
theology in particular that a problematic methodological plurality is found. In every
scientific activity, whether in the humanities or natural sciences, we encounter the same
problematic (Roy Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role of
Religious Belief in Theories [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005]). The
lively debate within the field of linguistics among cognitive, generative, and functionalistic
linguists is a good example of this reality. However, although the situation is different
within theology, linguists recognized much earlier both the impact of epistemological
conceptions and critically investigated them in order to uncover the origin of competing
linguistic theories (cf. William Foley, Anthropological Linguistics: An Introduction [Oxford:
Blackwell, 1997], 81-245; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The
Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought [New York: Basic, 1999]).
29

Besides Schaper, Kofoed, 247, should also be mentioned. In his latest extensive
analysis of the methodology of the Albertz-Lemche-Thomson-Davies school, he
stresses that “matter of method and presuppositions have been largely overlooked
in the debate over the epistemological and historiographical value of biblical texts.”
However, we need to acknowledge that a critical analysis of the philosophical
presuppositions involved is only one part of the story. Critical analyses of procedures
and characteristics of data (object; e.g., Bible) are needed as well. Consequently, a
critical assessment of the methodological analysis needs to include three aspects: man
as subject with his presuppositional contribution, the characteristic of the data to
be researched as object, and the methodological strategy as procedure for gaining
understanding about the data.
31
I will primarily follow Herman Dooyeweerd’s thought as presented in his
magnus opus (A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, vols. 1 and 2 [Lewiston: Mellen,
1997]). The basis for the presentation of Fernando Canale’s line of thinking will
be his dissertation, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial
Presuppositions, Andrews University Dissertation Series (Berrien Springs: Andrews
University Press, 1987).
30
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reasoning, responds to the present call for epistemological reflection, putting
them ahead of their times. In a unique and intriguing way, Dooyeweerd and
Canale involve themselves in a philosophical analysis of the structure of human
understanding by which they are able to develop an analytical framework for
deconstructing methodologies. It is this kind of analysis and framework that
is demanded if we want to arrive at clarity for our methodological struggles.
In the third article, I will first show how Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s critical
analyses of human understanding can be utilized to investigate the ontological
foundations of specific methodologies. Then I will explicate the differences
between Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s thinking (through comparison). In the last
article, I will attempt to critique Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s analyses in order to
prepare the work of transformation and further development. In this last step,
I hope to suggest epistemological criteria that can enrich the framework of
critical reflection on methodologies, their nature, and their impacts. Since all the
articles will draw heavily on my philosophical research at the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, I will often refer to that research.
My general expectation is that, by means of this series of articles, the
reader might become more sensitive and critical to the realm of methodologies
and realize that a reflection on biblical epistemology and ontology is not only
fruitful for biblical theology, but for all scientific disciplines. Specifically,
I expect that these articles will support the reader in reinterpreting the
hermeneutical relation between author/event, text/artifact, and interpreter
from the perspective of a biblical understanding of epistemology and ontology.
This calls for the reader to involve himself or herself with constructing a
biblical perspective on historical progression that integrates both normativity
and subjectivity. The latter will enable a careful thinker to have a fresh look at
the diversity of biblical-text tradition as well as the inner textual diversity of
the biblical testimony.
*********
Part I/IV: Dooyeweerd on Reason
1.1 Introduction to Dooyweerd’s Thought
It is widely held that rational thinking and its application in science and
philosophy as theoretical thinking is neutral. It is this belief that is the
foundation of many philosophical traditions and sciences, and even functions
as a legitimatization and justification for the reliability of the latter. At the
foundation of the claim that rational thinking is neutral lies the assumption
that rational thinking is autonomous.32 The central unity that the many
different philosophical schools experience in their general assumption
32
Autonomy is the presupposition for neutrality. This is because autonomy includes
the idea of practical or material independence, i.e., self-sufficiency. Consequently,
something which proposes to be autonomous cannot be influenced or determined in
its being by something or someone else since the power of determination is of and
in itself. If reason is considered to be neutral and as having the potential of “pure
judgments,” it is claiming an autonomous status.
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about the neutrality of rational thought, however, stands in tension with
the diversity of fundamental conceptions of the autonomy of rational and
theoretical thought.33 Unity is experienced in the claim that rational thought
is autonomous, but not in the argumentation for the autonomy of rational
thought. In the field of science and philosophy, the rationality of thought
finds its most abstract application in theoretical thinking. If there is no
unifying idea about the nature of theoretical thought, how can one claim
unity in the idea of the neutrality and autonomy of theoretical thought and
claim that science is neutral? How can one claim the autonomy of reason if
there is not even an agreement about what reason is?
Behind this problem lies the answer of why, perhaps, the philosophical
discourse of the twentieth century became increasingly a discourse of
misunderstanding, unable to beget mutual apprehension among different
philosophical schools. The doubt about the pretentious claim of neutrality
of theoretical thought even increases when one considers the results and
conclusions of depth psychology and existentialism, which show that in
matters of truth, human reason cannot function as ultimate judge.34
This background urges any thinker to examine the deeper reason why
there are so many conceptions about the nature of the autonomy of reason
and what role and determining influence different presuppositions play in
the formulation of a conception of reason. Dooyeweerd was motivated
to inquire into the universal inner structure of theoretical thought itself.
An understanding of the universal inner structure of theoretical thought
promises the possibility for understanding the origin of the different
philosophical conceptions of reason and their claim of the autonomy of
reason. In addition, it might help the diligent thinker to grasp the underlying
problems that are involved in philosophical discourse and provide answers
about whether theoretical thought is really neutral.
The analysis of the universal structure of theoretical thought goes
beyond an immanent analysis that looks for the inner logical consistency of
any concept about reason. Such an analysis will even go beyond a transcendent
analysis of reason that investigates the differences between existing
conceptions. “Transcendental,” here understood as a technical term, refers to
the formal conditions that are needed in order to allow for the acquisition of
philosophical and theoretical knowledge.35 That is why Dooyeweerd calls his
33
Cf. Yong Joon Choi, Dialog and Antithesis: A Philosophical Study on the Significance
of Herman Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique, Hermit Kingdom Studies in History and
Religion (Cheltenham, PA: Hermit Kingdom, 2006), 76.
34
Herman Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought: Studies in the Pretended
Autonomy of Philosophical Thought (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1960), 2.
35
The term “transcendental” is taken from Kant’s philosophy, but receives a
radical new interpretation that assumes a creational ontic order and that functions as
the condition for our thinking (René van Woudenberg, “Theorie van het Kennen,” in
Kennis en werkelijkheid, Tweede inleiding tot een christelikjke filosofie [Amsterdam: Buijten &
Schipperheijn, 1996], 62-69; L. Kalsbeek, Bernard Zylstra, and Josina Van Nuis Zylstra,
Contours of a Christian Philosophy: An Introduction to Herman Dooyeweerd’s Thought: A Supplement
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analysis of the structure of theoretical thought a transcendental critique since
it inquires into the “universally valid conditions which alone make theoretical
thought possible, and which are required by the immanent structure of
this thought itself.”36 An analysis of the universal structure of reason will
consequently be of transcendental character since it goes beyond the dogmatic
examination of conceptions into the analysis of the structural realities. These
realities are involved in any formulation of any theoretical conception. Only a
critique that transcends any transcendent and immanent critique to become a
transcendental critique will be able to critically inquire into the dogma of the
autonomy of theoretical thought. We will see that through its ambition the
transcendental critique receives a strong hermeneutical character.
The supposition that theoretical thinking is not neutral is based on the
tension between the common claim of the autonomy of reason and the different
contradicting conceptions of it. This supposition, along with the insights of
depth psychology and existentialistic philosophy, shows that Dooyeweerd’s call
for a transcendental critique is justified. The conclusion of his inquiry into the
universal inner structure of theoretical thought shows that the dogma of the
autonomy of theoretical thought, whether found in philosophy or science, can
no longer be upheld. According to Dooyeweerd, the structure of reason itself
shows that theoretical thinking is in need of a religious choice that cannot be
found in reason itself, but necessarily transcends it.37
Dooyeweerd developed two analyses of the inner nature of theoretical
thought—the first and second ways, which can be understood as two
different possible routes for a transcendental critique. Both ways are built
upon Dooyeweerd’s modal theory. Thereafter I will focus on the second
way, as it draws more strongly on the modal theory and represents the later
Dooyeweerd, which I am here focusing on.38 Because of the dependent
relation between the transcendental critique and the modal theory, I will first
give a short explanation of Dooyeweerd’s modal theory before I describe his
second way of analyzing the structure of theoretical thought.
1.2 Model Theory: On the Plurality of Being
1.2.1 Interpretational Choice and Universal Structural Data
Within the history of philosophy, the interpretations of the nature of
empirical data in temporal reality can roughly be categorized into two opposing
perspectives. The first perspective, taken in its extreme form, constitutes
to the Collected Works of Herman Dooyeweerd [Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 2002], 172-174).
36
Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 1: 37.
37
Choi, 52-53.
38
For the first way, see Oliver Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief: A
Limited Comparison, Critical Assessment, and Further Development of Herman
Dooyeweerd’s Structural Analysis of Theoretical Thought and Fernando Canale’s
Phenomenological Analysis of the Structure of Reason and Its Biblical Interpretation”
(M. A. Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2006), 32-38.
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the notion that the idea a person has when he or she experiences a thing
(e.g., an event, an object, a living being) is the representation of the thing
in itself. Human beings, therefore, have an objective understanding of the
thing outside themselves. The second perspective, taken in its extreme form,
constitutes the notion that the idea a person has when he or she experiences a
thing is a representation of his or her (mental) creation of the thing he or she
is experiencing. Human beings, therefore, have only subjective access to the
thing outside themselves and can never know what is really external to their
own subjective state. In this rather complex age-old and ongoing dilemma
between the subjective and the objective perspective, Dooyeweerd wants
to formulate an interpretation of the nature of empirical data in temporal
reality by adopting a radical Christian starting point rather than joining either
the subjective or the objective perspectives. In this way, his modal theory
is nothing other than an interpretative analysis of the universally shared
experience of temporal reality.39
According to Dooyeweerd, the naïve experience of temporal reality
with all its diversities can only be interpreted correctly when one takes the
sovereignty of God as the creator of reality (i.e., both of the thinking human
being and his or her object of thought and experience) as the ultimate starting
point for one’s interpretation. Only when this starting point is taken, will
one be able to do justice to the experienced datum that is present to anyone
irrespective of his or her religious faith and philosophical frameworks.
Although interpretation can take place only when one chooses a starting
point or basic paradigm of interpretation, critical inspection takes place by
comparing the interpretational concept with the experienced datum.
Being aware of the different routes that interpretation (from a starting
point as interpretational framework and the experienced datum toward a
formulation of a concept of temporal reality) and critical inspection (from
experienced datum towards the formulated concept of it) take, Dooyeweerd
stresses that one cannot arrive at the same interpretation and analytical
conclusion if one does not share his starting point. Thus, seen from the
direction of the rational activity of interpretation, the construction of his
interpretation of temporal reality is impossible if one does not accept the
biblical God as being the creator of temporal reality.40 However, seen from
the direction of the rational activity of critical inspection, verification by
thinkers who do not share his interpretational starting point is possible. Such
a verification process can take place on the basis of empirical data (as state of
affairs) and his many philosophical arguments, which stay strong even without
his interpretational starting point. Consequently, Dooyeweerd’s philosophy

39
For Dooyeweerd, temporal reality is the naïvely experienced everyday reality.
However, temporal reality is not the only realm of creation. He also knows of the
created supratemporal self, which will be introduced in the course of this article. Here
“temporal” refers to reality whenever the daily experienced reality is meant.
40
Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought, 53.
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can have a persuasive impact on those who do not share the same religious
choice.41
1.2.2 Interpretation of Naïve Experience
To avoid misunderstanding Dooyeweerd, it is important to see that the
structural datum he is speaking of does not represent an ontology; rather, it
refers to the empirical data of experienced temporal reality.42 The structural
datum that represents the reference for the justification of philosophical
conceptions is the human experience of temporal reality. This experience is a
universal datum that is independent of ontological conceptions. It is the task
of philosophy to find conceptions and interpretations of the structural datum
that can be justified by the experience of temporal reality. The structural
datum then functions as the central focus of theoretical conceptualization
and as the background for any critical assessment of theoretical concepts.
In order to introduce the modal theory as an attempt to interpret reality
as structural datum, I would like to describe two characteristics of human
experience as datum: naïve experience and experience of scientific analogies.
Rene van Woudenberg provides examples of structural datum that show
that the diversity of experience of a particular thing among different persons
raises the question of the origin of this diversity.43 His example demonstrates
how diverse the experiences of the same concert can be among different
persons: This is not worth the money! What a scratching of horse hairs
on cat’s bowels! What an uplifting social atmosphere! What a pure music!
These various opinions about the same experience reveal differing economic,
biological, social, or aesthetic perspectives.
How, then, is it possible that the same thing is experienced in such a
variety of ways? Further, how is it possible that everyone understands what
is meant by the diverse expressions of others and relates it to the same event
they themselves have described differently? As referred to at the beginning
of 1.2.1, there are, in principle, two different answers given within the history
of philosophy: the concept of the thing in focus is either the projection of
the subject on the object, or it is the projection of the object on the subject.
In some strands of postmodern philosophy, the latter opinion can no longer
be taken very seriously since it is difficult to explain that the object projects
different impressions on the different subjects unless one allows for the
determinative nature of the subject’s interpretational framework itself.44
Dooyeweerd’s approach to this question is different since he can see that all
the different expressions relate to the different modes of being inherent to
anything that is experienced and observed.
Ibid., 57-58.
Choi, 61.
43
René van Woudenberg, Gelovend Denken: inleiding Tot Een Christelijke Filosofie,
Verantwoording (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 2004), 66-70.
44
Alvin Plantinga, On Christian Scholarship (http://www.calvin.edu/academic/
philosophy/ virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/on_christian_scholarship.pdf).
41
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All things exist by a multitude of modes and express several aspects of
their being simultaneously. The economic, biological, social, and aesthetic
perspectives that were chosen by the people in our example refer to the
different modes of concert-being. The different emphasis that is brought in
through the subject’s side reveals both the diversity of the observed thing and
the aspectual perspective the subject chooses while describing the experienced
thing. Thus both the object and the subject contribute to the interpretation of
the structural datum. Such a modal interpretation helps to do justice to two
moments of the structural datum. First, it explains why in our naiveté we feel
that we have not understood the phenomenon of a thing fully by interpreting
it from a certain modal perspective (the concert seems to have more functions
than just a biological function). Second, it explains why people who have
different expressions about the same thing can still understand each other and
know what the expressions refer to.
The diversity of expression, then, can often find its background in the
individual focus on a specific mode of a thing’s being—a mode that anyone
can recognize and talk about, although their subjectively chosen focus might be
different. Thus, for example, a concert can be understood not only economically
(and thus cannot be reduced to the economical perspective alone), but also
reveals many other aspects. This is why a diversity of expressions about the
same thing does not hinder communication about the thing, thereby making
mutual understanding possible. In a certain way, then, diversity is inherent to
the things themselves, independent of their observers.
The second characteristic of human experience concerns the scientific
realm of human activity. From the scientific perspective, there is a drive to
discover, through the application of a certain discipline, specific processes
and laws. The results of this drive can be seen in the formulation of analogies.
In biology, for example, the principle of “life” as the struggle for survival is
applied to all of reality. Consequentially, all aspects of reality (e.g., religion,
business, society, or morality) are understood to be a part and expression
of the biological struggle to survive. The analogies of the biological aspect
find themselves in words such as “religious life,” “business life,” “social life,”
and “moral life.” The analogies of the psychic aspect find themselves in
formulations such as feeling “for logical coherence, cultural feeling, linguistic
feeling, aesthetic feeling, legal feeling, moral feeling.”45
These analogies can tempt a scientist to place the origin of religion,
business, society, or morality within the basic biological life-death struggle.
This drive to understand all of reality through discovered principles, laws,
and processes of a specific science shows that it is difficult to reduce any
science to another since the reduced science (e.g., neuron-physics reduces
psychology to a subcategory of neuron-physics) can also reduce any science
to its own subcategory. Where such a reduction through the absolutization of
one’s scientific discipline takes place, we speak of the phenomenon of “isms”
(e.g., biologism, physicalism, psychologism).
Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought, 10-11.
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Because Doooyeweerd interprets the structural data of the temporal
horizon of reality from his Christian starting point, he cannot allow any part
of creation to become the originator of any other part. Therefore, he does
not allow the absolutization of any aspect of reality or scientific discipline, but
instead interprets the existence of a diversity of sciences. Further, he allows
for the fact that the absolutistic attempts of any science, together with the
diversity of naïve experience, does not hinder interpersonal communication,
but actually hints toward the modal diversity of reality itself. Thus he can
philosophically justify and support the existing diversity of scientific
disciplines since different irreducible perspectives on reality are possible due
to the multimodality of being.
As science has shown, there are laws and norms within reality that have a
structural nature and which belong to reality itself. Since there are irreducible
perspectives to reality, we relate the different modal laws not hierarchically but
horizontally to each other. The laws of the psychic aspect of things cannot
be explained by and do not originate from the biological-aspectual laws.
Although one aspect is related to the other and necessarily dependent on the
other modalities, this relation is not of a causal character.46 The laws of one
modal aspect cannot explain the laws of the other modal aspects, although
mutual influence takes place in the sense that one modal aspect is present
within any other modal aspect in an analogical sense.
1.2.3 Being as Temporal Being
Besides the fact that the structural data show that different expressions
by different people about the same thing are possible without hindering
communication and understanding, they also show that a person can decide
to have different perspectives about something without experiencing a
fragmentation of that thing. Thus, although different perspectives can be
chosen, the structural datum always expresses coherence and unity. This is
why it makes sense that Dooyeweerd describes the structural datum, which
consists of a diversity of modal aspects, as a diversity of coherence rather
than an antithetical diversity. The many modal ways in which we experience
reality (ervaringswijzen, manners of experience) are of a coherent character
pointing to a central unity. Therefore, the economic and aesthetic aspects of
a concert are not experienced as contradicting or antithetical, but as integral
parts of the concert.
Due to his Calvinistic viewpoint that accepts God’s essential being as
timeless47 and his creation as temporal, Dooyeweerd concludes that time is
the common factor of all modal aspects and that through time all aspects are
bound into an inner coherence as indissoluble interrelations.48 Cosmic time, as
46
Herman Dooyeweerd, “Het Tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee,”
Philosophia reformata: orgaan van de Vereeniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte 5 (1940): 200.
47
On the difference between Dooyeweerd’s understanding of timelessness and
the Greek understanding of timelessness, see note in Glanz, 16, n. 20.
48
Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, vol. 3 (Philadelphia:
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created temporality, holds all modal aspects of reality together and guarantees
the naïve experience of inner coherence of any particular thing and reality
in general. Because of this temporal coherence between different modalities,
analogical relations within the different scientific disciplines are possible from
the perspective of any modal aspect (e.g., the analogical moments of the
biological aspect of being find their expression in, for example, the economic,
religious, moral, or inner life).49 The reason for the coherence-function of
time can only be understood when we see that Dooyeweerd interprets the
different aspects of being as aspects of cosmic time or time-modalities. Time
is, therefore, experienced in its diversity of modalities of being. The modal
laws are nothing other than laws of cosmic time or, as Dooyeweerd puts it,
“orders of time.” Every aspect of reality is characterized by a typical timelaw. Dooyeweerd discerns fifteen different time-laws as temporal aspects of
reality:50
-numerical
-spatial
-kinematic
-energetic (physicochemical relations of
empirical reality)
-biotic
-psychic (feeling/sensation)
-logical (analytic manner of distinction
lying at the foundation of all concepts
and logical judgments)

-historical (experience of the cultural
manner of the development of social
life)
-linguistic (symbolic signification)
-social
-economic
-aesthetic
-juridical
-moral
-faith

In “Het tijdprobleem in de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee” (the problem of
time in the philosophy of the law-idea), Dooyeweerd explains his understanding
and interpretation of time, detailing how every modal-law-sphere is a temporal
order. Time expresses itself in different ways through the modal aspects.
These aspects differ from each other in the ways they manifest themselves
in time. For example, in numeric modality the order of numbers is to be
understood in the temporal order of earlier and later numbers; in kinematic
modality, time expresses itself as an order of succession of movement; in
biotic modality, time is revealed through the order of the development of
organic life (e.g., birth, maturing, becoming older, dying); in logical modality,
item-order is expressed, for example, through the logical prius and posterius.
The sovereignty of a modality is identified by its zinkern (meaning-kernel) and

Presbyterian and Reformed, 1958).
49
Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought, 10-11.
50
These orders of cosmic time are relating themselves in an anticipatory and
retrocipatory temporal order of analogies. For the sake of this article series, it is not
necessary to explain this any further. An introductory explanation can be found in
Woudenberg, Gelovend Denken, 76-78.
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its wetskring (circle of law).51 The zinkern (meaning-kernel) refers to the central
identity of a single modality. In the case of numeric modality, this would be
the “discrete quantiteit,” which means that any particular thing can also be
described by focusing on the aspect of its countability.52 The modal meaningkernel of every aspect guarantees the irreducibility of the specific modality.53
Besides the modal meaning-kernel, any modality can be characterized by
its wetskring (circle of laws). The modal-specific circle of laws is an expression
of the modal meaning-kernel. In the case of the numeric modal meaningkernel of “countability,” the numeric circle of laws finds expression in the
laws of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.54 The different
modal laws refer “backward” and “forward” to other modal laws. In the same
way, the spatial aspect refers back to the numeric aspect since there is no space
without the modality of “more and less.” On the other side, the spatial aspect
refers forward to the kinematic aspect since it is through movement that this
aspect exists.55 Thus all laws unite in their basic characteristic of referring and
expressing to one another.
In order to better understand Dooyeweerd’s differentiation between
naïve and theoretical thinking in his analysis of the structure of philosophical
and theoretical thinking, it is necessary to introduce another concept. In the
Dooyeweerdian view, everything that is created is subject to modal law. However,
the ways in which created things are subjected to modal law differ extensively.
To prevent a disproportionate introduction into Dooyeweerd’s thing-structures,
I will discuss only two relevant terms: subject-function and object-function.
What is meant by thing-structures is that all things have all modal aspects,
either as subject or as object.56 For example, water does not have a subjectfunction, but it does have an object-function in its biotic aspect. That is, water
does not live, but is needed for the life of other created things and beings.
Consequently, plants and water relate to each other in their biotic aspect in
the form of a subject-object relation. A stone can serve as another example.
A stone does not have a subject-function in its linguistic aspect since it cannot
speak, but it does have an object-function in this specific modality because
one can speak about it. The stone’s linguistic object-function is only activated
if it stands in relation with the linguistic subject-function of another entity.
A subject-subject relation is also possible when two things have one or more
subject-functions in specific modalities in common. For example, when two
human beings communicate with each other, there will be a subject-subject
relation within their linguistic modality.
According to the modal theory, time embraces and penetrates all reality.
Being is always being in time and is always full temporal being. Within
Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought, 9.
Woudenberg, Gelovend Denken, 75.
53
Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought, 9.
54
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creation, nothing transcends the dynamic temporal horizon of being except
the supratemporal heart, as I will show. The supratemporal heart transcends
time, but not creation, as it is itself created. Time expresses itself in temporal
reality in a diversity of mutually irreducible functions or means of being. This
is of utmost importance if one wants to understand Dooyeweerd’s critique of
classical philosophy. To him, even space is a time-category and was mistakenly
taken for a static-timeless reality, creating a dichotomy between temporal and
timeless reality.57 To him, creation is characterized as meaning-being, a term
referring to the radical dependence of creational being. This dependence can
be seen on different levels. On the modal level, every law-sphere necessarily
refers to other law-spheres and all temporal law-spheres to a supratemporal
central unity.
On the supramodal level, the unity-heart refers to its own origin, as I
will show. In fact, there is no self-sufficient created-being. Created-being is
through its dependence on a [non-Greek]58 timeless God. Consequently,
timelessness and supratemporality should not be confused! Timelessness
is a characteristic that belongs only to the self-sufficient creator-God.
Supratemporality exists only within the realm of creation. Everything that
exists through God’s creation is meaning-being. Meaning-being, on one hand,
is relative being because it expresses a radical dependence on the creator.
On the other hand, the relativity of meaning-being is expressed through its
interdependent relationship with the rest of creation that is subject to the
same law.59 This radical character of creation’s dependence on the creator is
also referred to by the term “concentric law.”60 The law, then, is the absolute
boundary between God and his creation, and the origin of the law is God’s
sovereign creative will.61
1.2.4 Coherence and Unity—Time and the I
In Dooyeweerd’s thinking, there are at least two elements that contribute to
human naïve experience as an experience of inner coherence. On one hand,
we have the many analogical moments that time makes possible and which
enable us to experience modal diversity not as antithetical diversity, but as a
diversity of coherence. The modal aspects are the simultaneous Seinsweisen
of a thing.62 On the other hand, the experience of this diversity within inner

Dooyeweerd, “Het Tijdsprobleem in De Wijsbegeerte Der Wetsidee,” 167.
Since Dooyeweerd’s conception of the timelessness of God is explained as
being different from the Greek-Aristotelian understanding of timelessness (cf. n.
47), I will from here on refer to Dooyeweerd’s timelessness of God as [non-Greek]
timelessness in order to prevent confusion. See here Glanz, 20, n. 35.
59
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coherence refers necessarily to a basic unity as central totality.63 This experience
of unity is made possible through the self or the human heart that is created
with the ability to bring the inner coherence of temporal modal diversity to a
supratemporal unity. This is of crucial importance to understand.
Humanity was created in the image of God as an expression of the unity
of the creator. The human self, then, is of supratemporal character since it
makes humanity’s unity-experience of the temporal modal aspect problematic
and reductionistic.64 Humanity’s unity-self, however, receives its unity-ability
only through God’s creating man and woman as imago dei.65 Thus the unityself is not independent but dependent and, therefore, refers not only to
the unity of the creator, but to the expression of the unity of the creator
who is beyond created temporality and created supratemporality. Thus the
supratemporal self-unity is dependent on and refers to the timeless unity of
God. Further, it is within the creational order of time, which is broken into a
diversity of time-aspects that stand in an indissoluble interrelationship. In this
interrelationship, every aspect refers within and beyond itself to all the others.
The temporal coherence, then, refers to a supratemporal unity, which, in turn,
refers to the timeless unity of the creator God.
1.2.5 The I and Living
To briefly summarize, all being is temporal being and all being is expressing and
living the whole temporal order of reality. It is only humanity that can transcend
this temporal order through the self by expressing through its supratemproal
unity-self the timeless divine unity-creator. Although Dooyeweerd does not
seem to elaborate more on what he understands by the timelessness of God,
he stresses that he does not have the Greek-Parmenidean idea of timelessness
in mind.66 This step from time to supratemporality should not be understood
as creating a similar dichotomy as form and matter. To Dooyeweerd, the
being of things is not matter, but the real thing as it is in time. Also to him,
the relation between the temporal thing and its timeless creator is not a
relation through which a phenomenon is pointing to the thing in itself, but is
a necessary relation of a thing in itself that points to its creator.
As mentioned before, it is because of the created supratemporal
characteristic of the self that the I which lives within temporal reality cannot
be identified with a modal aspect. The I cannot be reduced toward a biological,
psychological, or rational I. Therefore, the idea of cogito ergo sum is a fundamental
misconception that identifies the I with a single temporal-order and forgets
that rational thinking is an act of a human I. The I is the subject of any human
temporal action. It is through the supramodal characteristic of the self that
its acts and experiences are taking place within an inner coherence and unity.
In contrast to the cogito ergo sum idea, the ego is expressing a meaning-totality,
Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 4.
Dooyeweerd uses the terms “self,” “heart,” and “I” interchangeably.
65
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i.e., a “totality in the coherence of all its functions within all the modal aspects
of cosmic reality.”67 But this meaning-totality itself is meaning and therefore
created. Meaning, however, has the universal structure of referring and
expressing (as the central law of meaning). Every thing that has meaning is
referring to and to a certain extent expressing something else within creation
but also beyond creation, hinting to the origin of creation itself. This necessary
ontic dependence is referred to as concentric law. In the heart’s dependence on
the divine creator-unity it can find its identity; in the relation with its temporal
acts and experiences the self can realize its identity within as an identity of
freedom and responsibility that is made possible through its imago dei—being as
an expression of the being of God as meaning-totality. The self is through this
radical dependence on the creator God experiencing the call to responsibility
and through its relation with the diversity of temporal-order it is experiencing
the limited focus and field of its responsibility.
In order to understand the relation of responsibility of the self toward
the modal diversity, it is necessary to return to the architecture of a single
modality.
Cosmic time is to be understood as having a cosmonomic and a factual
side.68 The cosmonomic represents the time-order, while the factual side
represents the duration of time-order as an activation of temporal order.69
What is meant by this is that the cosmonomic side as time-order is referring
to all the different modal meaning-kernels that are expressed in the form of
the different modal wetskringen (circles of laws). The factual side refers to the
specific living out of the modal laws as time-order by a thing or individual.
Any thing or individual is subject to the time-order and creates through this
subject-being an individual expression of the modal laws it is bound to. For
example, the biological time-order of birth, maturing, adulthood, aging, and
dying will find different expression in different subjects. The law-side of
reality as time-order does not exist outside of being, but only as a Seinsweise
(manner of being) of a subjective being. In reality, there is no time-order
without time-duration, no law-side without a subject; the one cannot exist
without the other.70 This interrelation expresses creational reality. Without the
subjective being of things the modal-laws would not exist. The time-order,
then, is an order that has potentiality. In the realization of this potentiality
within individual things or human beings, this potentiality becomes duration
and actuality.71 The result of this theoretical insight is that the opposition
between rationalistic and irrationalistic conceptions can no longer be upheld.
The cosmonomic side cannot be understood apart from its different individual
expressions within the factual side. In this sense, the being of a thing or
individual is always the factual actualization of the cosmonomic side of any
Ibid.
Ibid., 28.
69
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aspect. Any absolutization of the cosmonomic side will result in the loss of
human responsibility, as any absolutization of the factual side will result in a
loss of normativity. Since both responsibility and normativity belong to the
structural data of our naïve experience, this theory claims to do justice to this
universal datum.
Because of the two sides of created cosmic time (cosmonomic and
factual), expressed through all modal aspects, and because of the need of
positivization of the modal norms as a call that is addressing the supramodal
self, the self can, within the boundaries of the norm-structure, freely decide
how it wants to respond. Humans are not free in the sense of whether they
should respond, but free in the sense of how they will respond.72 As such, the
relation between the self and the modal diversity of reality is not a deterministic
one, but characterized by responsibility.73 Within the realm of the modalities
that have normative time-orders, the self will creatively respond to them in
either positivizing them in a faithful direction toward the meaning of the imago
dei or with an unfaithful direction away from God. The normative creational
modal structure of reality is the “universally valid determination and limitation
of the individual subjectivity which is responsibly subject to it.”74 The self ’s
relation to its creator as imago dei enables the awareness of its call to individually,
creatively and in a faithful manner disclose the potentiality in created reality. The
self can realize its identity fully and only in temporal reality when it transcends
it. As Viktor Frankl puts it: “Nur Existenz, die sich selbst transzendiet, kann
sich selbst verwirklichen” (Only existence, which transcends itself can come to
self realization.)75 In regard to theoretical and philosophical thinking, the self
only does justice to the imago dei as it develops a view of reality that allows for
a concept that does not absolutize anything within the structural datum. To be
able to do this, the self needs to acknowledge that of which it is an image as the
truly absolute origin of any meaning-being.
1.2.6 The Logical Modal Aspect
As we have seen, the logical aspect is considered to be one aspect of reality,
one Seinsweise of being that is lived through the self and is not to be identified
with the self. Dooyeweerd describes the zinkern of the logical modal aspect
as the “analytic mode of distinction.”76 Making distinctions as qualifying
characteristic of any act of analysis and conceptualization is one of the many
modal ways of human being.77 Dooyeweerd distinguishes between two attitudes
72
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of thought, i.e., naïve thought and theoretical thought. Logical distinction can
take place in a naïve attitude of thinking as well as in a theoretical attitude of
thinking. The difference between these two is that in our naïve attitude we
distinguish entities and things as a whole, while in our theoretical or scientific
attitude we make distinctions within entities by abstracting the modalities in
which they function. Thus in the naïve attitude we do not isolate the thing’s
ways of being, i.e., the modalities from the thing itself, but leave them in their
inner coherence as belonging inseparably to the thing under observation. We
can recognize the different ways of being but these ways are still experienced
as characteristics that belong to the thing that exhibits them.
By the abstract attitude of theoretical thinking, we isolate a single way
of the being of a thing, i.e., one of its modal aspects, and focus our “analytic
eye” on one characteristic itself. We thus theoretically separate a nonlogical
modality from a thing. Therefore, contrary to the naïve state of experience
where the modal diversity is experienced in an intermodal cosmic coherence,
in which no single aspect is experienced in singularity,78 theoretical thinking
by its analytic activity of distinction brings the modal diversity of temporal
reality to a distinct consciousness. The modal diversity is made explicit and
the modal nonlogical aspect that functions as the object of the theoretical
thought-act is theoretically disconnected from the intermodal coherence
in which it is experienced in the naïve state of living as it is given in the
structural data. The theoretical attitude of thought thus breaks the intermodal
coherence into many possible antithetical relations in which the nonlogical
modality in focus is functioning as the Gegenstand of the logical aspect. The
English translation of the German term Gegenstand would be “standing in
opposition.” The Gegenstand as object of theoretical thinking contrasts the
object of our naïve thinking.79
In Dooyeweerdian terminology the relations that we experience in the
naïve state are subject-object relations (or subject-subject relations),80 while
the relations that we experience in our theoretical thought-act are Gegenstandrelations.81
The basic understanding of the logical aspect will give us enough
background to enter Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique.
dentitatis, principium exludendae contradictionis, and principium exclusi tertii. Cf. Woudenberg,
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1.2.7 Summary82
Through the lens of his modal theory Dooyeweerd finds nothing in created
reality that is by nature independent or self-sufficient. Rather, he stresses that
every single aspect of reality is dependent on every other aspect of reality
and that, in the end, all of reality is dependent on the creator. Through these
dependence structures, explained as different time-orders, reality is lived as
meaningful in its being in time.
The modal theory, here only briefly covered, can however not fully account
for the diversity of human judgments that goes beyond the modal diversity
of a thing that is experienced. It does not account for the different theoretical
conceptions of reality resulting from different abstract interpretations of the
structural datum. There is more to the diversity of interpretations than the
diversity of modal aspects. Man can, with different attitudes, choose different
modal perspectives. Having said this, the next section will give a description
of Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique of theoretical thought.
1.3 Theoretical Thinking and Its
Religious Presuppositions
Dooyeweerd states that the great turning point in his philosophical thinking
was his discovery that thinking itself necessarily has a religious root. The
validity of this conclusion can be shown by two ways of argumentation. The
differences of the two ways stem from the direction they take in order to
come to the same conclusion. The first way starts from an anlysis of the
nature of philosophy. The second way starts from the inner structure of the
theoretical thought-act as the actualization of the logical aspect of temporal
reality on its abstract, nonnaïve level. Both ways end up with the enigmatic
question: what is the identity of the self that philosophizes and that involves
itself in theoretical thinking? Both ways of critique target the question of
what the self brings into its thought-act as determining factor in the process
of conceptualization. Dooyeweerd tries to show that the conceptualization
of the modal diversity of the structural datum (as a result of theoretical
thinking) necessarily involves the religious identity of the self.
Because both ways are assuming an influential difference between
philosophical/theoretical thinking and naïve thinking, without which the inner
structure of thought cannot be understood, first the present differentiation
that was already introduced in 1.2.6 will be elaborated. After that the second
way of Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique will be presented.
1.3.1 General Characteristic of Theoretical
Thinking versus Naïve Thinking
In order to understand Dooyeweerd’s distinction between theoretical thinking
and naïve thinking, one needs to keep in mind the general modal diversity
with its analogical relations and specifically the meaning of the analytic modal
aspect.
Cf. Glanz, 27.
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The logical aspect, as the seventh aspect of the fifteen modal aspects, is
the first aspect which is different from the earlier six aspects with regards to
human action, in two ways:
1. The modal zinkern (modal kernel) contains specific norms and not
laws in its wetskring (circle of laws). The difference is that the time-orders of
these normative aspects, represented by the zinkern, can be violated. They
function therefore much more as an appeal to the human freedom to live
responsibly, to be recognized, and applied positively. Thus, in living out
these norm-modalities we can choose to live them out in a responsible way.
Here the theoretical distinction between normbeginsel (norm-principle) as the
cosmonomic side and normpositiviering (norm-positivization) as the factual
side of time reappears. There are many different positivizations of norms
possible without transgressing or violating the norm. These modal norms are
therefore not only appealing towards the human freedom for responsibility
but are also an appeal to the human creativity to choose one positivization
out of many good positivizations of the potentiality of the cosmonomic side
belonging to all of reality.
2. Man is the only creature that has subject functions in the modal
aspects seventh to fifteenth. This underlines what has been said above, that
the norms of the zinkern are appeals to human responsibility and creativity.
Human beings are by creation subject to these norms and therefore called to
positivize them.
In order to prepare the explanation of how man’s responsibility comes to
the fore in his theoretical thought-acts, one needs to understand the difference
between the theoretical and naïve attitudes of analytic distinction.
Contrary to theoretical abstraction, naïve experience, or so-called
“common sense” experience, lacks any antithetical modal constructions. In
the naïve state, man experiences concrete things not in a theoretic-synthesized
but in a systatical way.83 Derived from the Greek sustasij/sunisthmi (in
contrast to ekstasij/ecisthmi), systase means “staying conjoint with each
other” or “staying united.” The reason why we experience the temporal
continuity of things in our naivety in a systatical way is theoretically explained
by the subject-object relation in which all the different modal aspects relate to
all the different modal aspects of the thing/event experienced. These modal
relations can either take the form of a subject-object relation or a subjectsubject relation.84 In the integral cosmic coherence, things cannot exist by
themselves but are dependent on other things for the realization of their
subject or object functions.
1.3.2 Transcendental Critique85
Dooyeweerd argues in the second way from what the ego does when it is
thinking theoretically. Thus the structure of the theoretical thought-act is the
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focus of the second way. Dooyeweerd argues that theoretical thought, in order
to be able to conceptualize the inner coherence of the structural datum, is
structurally in need of a self that brings in a religious decision that functions
as a starting point beyond the Gegenstand-relation.
When Dooyeweerd looks at the inner structure of theoretical thinking,
he uncovers three universal problematic characteristics of abstract thinking.
The universal characteristics of any theoretical thought-act are abstraction,
synthesis and the necessity of critical self-reflection.
1.3.2.1 The First Problematic Characteristic:
The Gegenstand-Relation
The first characteristic of theoretical thought is the abstraction of the
subject-object and subject-subject relations of naïve experience into different
Gegenstand-relations. Thus, this first problem refers back to a previously
mentioned distinction between the theoretical and pretheoretical attitudes of
the ego.
In the critical inquiry into the inner structure of theoretical thought,
we see that modal aspects are intentionally and theoretically uprooted from
their temporal coherence into antithetical relations and the logical aspect
relates antithetically to the nonlogical aspect under investigation. Without
this abstract attitude, the modal diversity of temporal reality could not be
discovered with distinctivieness, for the subject-object relations do not
experience an antithetical modal diversity of temporal reality within the
pretheoretical attitude.86
It is important to notice that theoretical abstraction is not understood
as abstracting reality from time. Theoretical abstraction only abstracts
intentionally from the temporal coherence but not from temporal diversity.
Since theoretical thought cannot transcend the realm of temporality, it remains
not only in the realm of diversity but also within the realm of coherence. The
inner coherence of the modal diversity belongs to the creational order from
which the self cannot detach its theoretical thinking. Theoretical thinking
therefore necessarily involves all modal aspects. As any other act, man’s
theoretical acting has a psychic, biological, aesthetic, etc. aspect. Consequently,
the antithetical situation that the logical aspect enforces between all modalities
and between its own modal structure and the Gegenstand is not a real, i.e., an
ontic, but a theoretical, i.e., a specific epistemic, problem. This is testified to
by the resistance the Gegenstand displays when one attempts to conceptualize
it in logical terms.87 This resistance necessarily evolves, because the logically
qualified concept of the Gegenstand cannot account for its nonlogical modality
that is not logically qualified. The different modal nonlogical analogies are
even present when a modality is abstracted into a Gegenstand. The abstracted
modal aspect (Gegenstand) expresses its ontic coherence with all other aspects

See Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 42-43.
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through the cosmic temporal coherence (expressed in analogical moments; cf.
1.2.3/4) from which theoretical thought intentionally tries to abstract.
The basic question that arises from the first problematic characteristic
in regard to the act of theoretical thinking is: what is the meaning of the
continuous bond of coherence in the diversity of modalities that we cannot
grasp through theoretical thought? This question cannot be answered because
the real coherence is lost through intentional abstraction at the very moment
one takes a theoretical attitude. Thus, in our theoretical attitude we lose the
inner coherence that we are searching for.88 Theoretical thought cannot
autonomously establish a concept of modal coherence without having an idea
of coherence that goes beyond theoretical thinking itself. With this in mind,
one can understand why Dooyeweerd cannot accept the philosophical dogma
of the autonomy of theoretical thought, that pretends to penetrate reality as
it is by means of theoretical thought.
1.3.2.2 The Second Problematic Characteristic:
The Search for Synthesis
If it is the aim of abstract thinking to form a theoretical concept of the
pretheoretical datum, and this datum cannot be conceptualized without
losing its coherence, how then can an explicit and theoretical formulation of
the implicitly, naïvely experienced coherence be possible? The first problem
addressed in the transcendental critique automatically leads to the second.
In order to be able to formulate a concept that does not defeat the
coherence of the pretheoretical datum, one must have an idea as reference
point that goes beyond the logical opposition and theoretical thought as a
whole, and can thereby direct the process of theoretical thinking. This idea
can allow for the possibility to theoretically formulate the inner coherence
of reality as theoretical synthesis. It can function as a point of central unity
that theoretically relates the modal aspects that were dissociated. We need a
transcendent reference point from which we can receive an idea of such a
central unity. To defend the dogma of the neutrality of theoretical thought,
it is necessary to find this central reference point for theoretical synthesis
within the Gegenstand-relation. The modal theory, however, has shown this
to be impossible, for the Gegenstand-relation “offers in itself no bridge
between the logical thought-aspect and its nonlogical ‘Gegenstand.’”89 If
the central reference point is sought in the Gegenstand-relation, it will lead to
the absolutization of a specific modal meaning-kernel and reduce all other
modalities to subcategories of the Gegenstand-relation.90 It will cut all the
lines of temporal coherence of the other modalities and will merely allow
the analogical moments of the particular Gegenstand. If this takes place, there
are as many possible theoretical syntheses as there are Gegenstand-relations.
The theoretical syntheses that flow from the dogma of the neutrality of
Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought, 12.
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theoretical thought lead to multiple types of reductionisms (biologism,
physicism, historicism . . . ). These types can be encountered in modern
science and philosophy.91 To Dooyeweerd this multitude of reductionisms
proves that they are not results of theoretical thought itself but testify to
the possibility of different supratheoretical decisions that are brought in by
the thinking I. By the structure of theoretical thought, the starting point for
theoretical thought cannot be found in thought itself, but most come from a
supratheoretical decision of the thinking I. This decision, which is basically a
religious one, will determine the outcome of the theoretical synthesis.92
How then can one find a supratemporal reference point that transcends
the theoretical antithesis in such a way that the act of theoretical synthesis
takes a direction that does justice to the structural datum? In asking this
question, one is searching for a starting point that offers a total view on
reality and is a necessity for any scientific thought at the moment it involves
itself in synthetical thinking. This leads to the last problem in our theoretical
thought-action. The self as the subject of all thinking activity is reflecting
about itself.
1.3.2.3 The Third Problematic Characteristic:
The Need of Self-reflection
Since a reference point for synthesis cannot be found in any law-structure
of a single modality, unless one thinks reductionistically, the search for
a supramodal starting point leads to that which guarantees the experience
of the diversity-coherence: the modal-transcendent self. Structurally seen,
theoretical thought is in need of a self that chooses a starting point that in
turn makes theoretical synthesis possible. How can you get to the self, how to
become aware of the self, and what actually is the self ?
The question cannot be answered without self-knowledge. But how can
you know yourself when a concept of the transcendent self is impossible?
How can you arrive at self-knowledge when true self-reflection cannot be of
theoretical character?
Biblically seen, the mystery of the central human ego is that it is nothing
in itself. The central ego cannot be found in the modal diversity. In fact,
as “soon as I try to grasp the I in a philosophical concept it recedes as a
phantom and dissolves itself into nothingness. It cannot be determined by
any modal aspect of our experience, since it is the central reference-point to
which all fundamental modes of our temporal experience are related.”93 If
the transcendent self is intrinsically dependent, in which dependence relation
can the I come to self-understanding? Is it the human I-thou relation, where
we only seem to understand that our selfhood is nothing without the other?94
Dooyeweerd answers in the negative, as this relation is as unable to come to
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self-realization as our relation to the temporal horizon of its experience. The
reason for this is that the encounter with the thou confronts us with the same
mystery as our own selfhood.95
Clearly seen in the first way, the self necessarily needs to find its origin
through its participation in the Archimedean standpoint, if it wants to be able
to give its thought-acts a direction towards totality. Within the Archimedean
standpoint the self comes to an understanding of the origin of its being and
meaning. Because of the inner structure of theoretical thought, an ultimate
idea of origin, also called “God,” necessarily needs to be chosen.96 True selfknowledge is therefore dependent on the knowledge of God; understanding
of man is dependent upon the understanding of God. This understanding is
generated through the relationship of the transcendent self with the divine
creator, in whose image man is created, and who reveals himself through
the words of the prophets within the human heart. This supratemporal selfidentity penetrates all temporal activity and being of man in his experience
and understanding, and allows man to engage in true theoretical synthesis in
both science and philosophy.97 Only by the understanding of the sovereignty
of the true God, all idols (absolutizations of created parts) are excluded and
all aspects of creation are taken as creation and not as gods. In contrast to real
self-understanding, the transcendent self that does not truly understand itself
always fails in its attempt to create a nonreductionist theoretical synthesis
because of its reductionistic starting point.
To summarize, theoretical thought, seen structurally, needs a startingpoint. The self will either find its true origin or will search for an idol that
replaces the true origin. Idolization leads to a reductionistic concept of the
totality of meaning, which in turn raises dualistic tensions, as the structural
datum does not allow for any type of reductionism.98
1.3.3 The Religious Ground-motive
Both ways of the transcendental critique of theoretical thought reveal the
necessity of a supratemporal starting point. The supratemporal starting point
supplies the self with the answers to the three supratemporal questions of
philosophical thought. The need for these transcendental ideas (idea of
coherence, unity, and origin) was revealed through the different theoretical
thought-act problems that belong to the universal structure of theoretical
thought. Dooyeweerd includes all the three transcendental ideas in the so-called
cosmonomic idea. The first idea concerns the modal coherence-diversity. It is
the transcendental idea of the whole of our temporal horizon of experience
with its diversity of modal aspects and their mutual interrelations. The second
idea concerns the central unity. It is referred to by the idea of coherence
as that which guarantees the unitary totality of the coherence-diversity. The
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third idea concerns the origin of the totality of meaning. It relates all that is
relative to the absolute and relates man as imago dei to the deus.
All three ideas are transcendental in character, for they spring not from
the temporal diversity nor the transcendent self. They are instead provided by
the religious ground-motive or man’s religion.99 This ground-motive functions
as a dynamis that keeps a religious community together. The “religious groundmotive is the central mainspring of the entire attitude of life and thought”100
and the condition for the specific content of the three transcendental
ideas that express the starting point for any theoretical action. Because the
transcendental ideas are required by the nature of theoretical thought, it is by
means of the religious ground-motive that philosophical thought is controlled
and a basic framework of interpretation created.
According to Dooyeweerd, every untrue religious ground-motive is of
dialectical nature. “Dialectic” here means that there are two absolutizations of
something creational that contrast irrevocably with other aspects of creation.
The result of this dialectical antithesis is that the theoretical synthesis that
is produced under its influence has many irreconcilable tensions and always
lacks real unity. The source of the absolutizations of two creational aspects is
to be found in the dogma of the autonomy of reason. This dogma motivates
man in his theoretical pursuit to search for unity and coherence in aspects
of temporal reality. The absolutization of a specific Gegenstand-relation
automatically forces another modal aspect (functioning opposition) into a
divinization, to battle its reduced status as mere subcategory. Dooyeweerd
describes this process when he says “any idol that has been created by the
absolutization of a modal aspect evokes its counter idol.”101 The reason for
such a “counter-divinization” is that the modal diversity is characterized by
an indissoluble interrelation in which all modal aspects are relative. They
relate analogically and not genetically to each other on the basis of their
sphere sovereignty. Only the biblical religious ground-motive can provide an
“undialectical” starting point, as it warns against any absolutization of the
relative-creational.
1.3.4 Summary
We have seen by means of the second way of the transcendental critique
that neither philosophical nor theoretical thought by its very inner structure
can be autonomous, but necessarily demands a religious starting point of
supramodal or supratheoretical character. Any religious starting point
that is chosen, whether it is of real supramodal character or expressed in
a Gegenstand-relation, structurally functions as supramodal and determines
theoretical synthetical conceptions by directing the ideas of coherence,
unity, and origin. In both ways of the transcendental critique, the need of
a theoretical synthesis is the crux of philosophical thinking generally and
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theoretical thought specifically. Thus, philosophical and scientific thought
cannot be absolute, but is fallible like every other human activity. Only the
origin of creation has an independence-status that can be considered truly
absolute.102 The religious starting point of man’s thinking is delivered in the
revelation of the creator God, which leads our fallible human activity to come
to increasingly understand the meaning of relative reality.
It is the dogmatic view of the neutrality of theoretical thought that turned
fallible and relative human activity into something absolute and consequently
leads to exclusivistic, reductionistic ideas.
One needs to keep in mind, however, that with the discovery of the
nonneutrality of abstract rational thinking, rational normativity was not lost.
Rational thinking is through the normative principles of the logical modal
aspect of universal normative character. At the same time it is also relative.
1.4 Conclusion
For our reflection on methodology within biblical theology, Dooyeweerd’s
analysis is impacting. Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique of thought
triggers the question to what extent the exegetical methodologies developed
so far are influenced by transcendental ideas that absolutize one modal aspect
of created reality. Is the unity and coherence of the writings of Holy Scripture
not often sought in a wetskring of a specific modal kernel?
Let me give two examples that seem to affirm the latter question:
1. The depth-psychological approach of biblical exegesis tries to explain
the value and truth of the biblical writings exclusively from the viewpoint of
the Freudian principle of “individuation” and other related perspectives. For
theologians like the well-known Eugen Drewermann, exegesis is performed
in complete analogy to Traumdeutung as basically developed by Freud and
Jung.103 Biblical narratives and teachings are therefore primarily seen as the
objectification of complex inner psychological processes which are to be
decoded. Thus, the origin and motivation for the development of biblical/
religious texts is located in the psychological wetskring of the complex process
of man’s self-discovery. Such argument results from the absolutization of the
psychic modality.
2. Sociohistorical methodology (cf. Albertz, Lemche, Crüsemann,
Schottroff and others) attempts to find the coherence and origin of biblical
texts as of crucial methodological importance.104 As consequence, the history
of religion is made equivalent to the history of socioeconomic development.
Thus, biblical descriptions of God’s intervention in human history are easily
reduced to interests of specific social classes. This type of exegesis results
from the absolutization of the economic or social modality.
As Dooyeweerd pointed out, theoretical thinking runs the risk of
absolutizing an aspect of created being. The laws of creational aspects can
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start to deliver the content of the transcendental ideas, which influence the
development of methodologies by which we interpret the world in general
and biblical texts specifically.
Consequently, Talstra’s call (see “Introduction”) for “order” in regard
to the plurality of methodologies is not enough. To move beyond our
problematic methodological situation, one needs to uncover the transcendental
ideas that are at work in specific methodologies and give them their proper
nonautonomous place within the complex activity of interpretation.
However, this last suggestion cannot be realized without acknowledging
that human reason is fundamentally dependent on transcendental ideas.
Dooyeweerd explained that the very dogma of the autonomy of reason
is responsible for the many different and mutually exclusive conceptions
of reason. This dogma allowed the many absolutizations of theoretical
abstractions to go unrecognized and thus a diversity of opposing philosophical
views concerning human experience of reality were formulated—all of them
lacking a truly critical justification. Thus, critical self-reflection for the biblical
theologian is urgently required if he wants to receive his transcendental ideas
from the One who is really autonomous.
These conclusions are drawn in the awareness that Dooyeweerd’s
argumentation has not yet been critically analyzed. This analysis will be
featured in the following articles. However, the reader might already sense that
there are persuasive reasons to appreciate Dooyeweerd’s modal theory and his
conception of the nonneutrality of human thinking to a certain extent, even
though his line of argument must also be criticized.
Having introduced Dooyeweerd’s structural analysis of the theoretical
thought-act, we are prepared to compare and contrast it with the
phenomenological structure of Reason and its biblical interpretation as it is
presented by Fernando Canale. The understanding of the phenomenological
structure of Reason will help us to set up a critical perspective on Dooyeweerd’s
understanding of thought-acts and allow us to provide an even deeper insight
into the general structure of human understanding. The second article of this
series, then, will introduce the phenomenological structure of Reason and its
biblical interpretation.

